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1. intRoduction
The question of the disvalue suffered by animals in nature, that is, the 
problem of suffering and other harms suffered by animals in nature, has 
taken on a new relevance at present, becoming a matter of great practical 
importance, to be addressed in applied ethics. Taking this disvalue into 
account, several authors have examined its moral implications.
This paper reviews the main literature that has dealt with those issues 
over the last years. It presents an annotated bibliography of principal works 
on this question. The existence of subsequent inclusion of essays in a col-
lective work is indicated in the notes. 
Only monographs and articles published in journals are included. 
Nonetheless, there are several writing pieces on the topics of interest that 
are available on the internet and have not been published as monographs 
or in academic journals: Pearce 2009, 2012, 2013; Tomasik 2009a, 2009b, 
2013; McMahan 2010a, 2010b. While only essays in English are annotated, 
there are several essays published in other languages: Bonnardel 1996, 
2005; Laporte 2000; Guyard (2002) 2012; de Lora 2007; Horta 2007, 2011, 
2013, 2014; Torres Aldave 2009, 2011; Longueira Monelos 2011; Cunha 
2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Faria 2011, 2012; Dorado 2012; Cunha 
and Garmendia 2013.
 1 The author would like to thank Max Carpendale, Oscar Horta, Kate Marples, 
Pablo Stafforini and Brian Tomasik for their help in preparing this paper.
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2. a bibliogRaphical examination of the liteRatuRe
 about ethical inteRventionS in the wild
Clark, Stephen R.L. 1979. “The Rights of Wild Things”. Inquiry 22 (1-4): 
171-88. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/
00201747908601871. doi: 10.1080/00201747908601871.
In this paper, Clark examines Ritchie’s reductio that granting natural rights 
to nonhuman animals will force us to the conclusion that we must protect 
animal preys against predators that wrongly violate the victims’ rights. 
Clark shows that we should defend nonhuman animals against large or 
unusual dangers, when we can; but he claims that we should not seek to 
protect nonhuman animals against other nonhuman animals, because we 
shall easily slip into thinking that they owe us something for which they 
should pay. He concludes that nonhuman animals may have rights, even 
rights of welfare, without any absurd implication. The paper was included 
in this book: Clark, Stephen R.L. 1997. Animals and Their Moral Standing, 
16-30. London: Routledge.
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1982. “Nonmoral Nature”. Natural History 91: 19-26.
In this essay, Gould claims that Buckland’s considered predation as the pri-
mary challenge to an ideal world, and that Buckland pointed out that carni-
vores increase enjoyment and diminish pain. In response to Buckland, Gould 
presents several cases of disvalue in nature, related to parasitism. Gould also 
argues that the answer to the dilemma of why cruelty exists in nature can only 
be that there isn’t any answer; it is a strategy that works for ichneumon flies 
and that natural selection has programmed into their behavioral repertoire. 
He concludes that if nature is nonmoral, then evolution cannot teach any 
ethical theory at all. Included in: Jacobus, Lee A., ed. 2010. A World of Ideas: 
Essential Readings for College Writers, 8th edn., 635-48. Boston: Bedford.
Sagoff, Mark. 1984. “Animal Liberation and Environmental Ethics: Bad 
Marriage, Quick Divorce”. Osgoode Hall Law Journal 22: 297-307.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol22/iss2/5.
In this essay, Sagoff argues that the granting of rights to animals should 
lead to concentrating efforts on ensuring basic welfare of animals in 
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nature. He maintains that a liberationist position should involve ecosystem 
management to benefit wildlife. He explains that it is not possible to be 
both an environmentalist and an animal liberationist: the environmentalist 
sacrifices the lives of individual animals to preserve the authenticity, integ-
rity and complexity of ecosystems; and the liberationist sacrifices these to 
protect the rights and lives of animals. He concludes that an ethics based 
on the appreciation of the animals does not help to understand or justify 
an environmental ethic. Included in: Schmidtz, David, and Elizabeth Wil-
lott, eds. 2002. Environmental Ethics, 38-44. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Sapontzis, Steve F. 1984. “Predation”. Ethics and Animals 5 (2): 27-38. 
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/ethicsandanimals/vol5/iss2/4/.
In this paper, Sapontzis examines the so-called predation reductio: humans 
are obligated to alleviate avoidable animal suffering; animals suffer when 
they are preyed upon by other animals; therefore, humans would be obli-
gated to prevent predation; but such an obligation would be absurd; the-
refore, humans are not obligated to alleviate avoidable animal suffering. 
He argues that we are morally obligated to alleviate unjustified animal suf-
fering that it is in our power to prevent without occasioning as much or 
more unjustified suffering. He points out that animals suffer when they are 
preyed upon by other animals, and claims that we are morally obligated to 
prevent predation whenever we can do so without occasioning as much 
or more justified suffering than the predation would create. Included in: 
Sapontzis, Steve F. 1987. Morals, Reason, and Animals, 229-48. Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press.
Jamieson, Dale. 1990. “Rights, Justice, and Duties to Provide Assistance: a 
Critique of Regan’s Theory of Rights”. Ethics 100: 349-62. doi: 10.1086/
293181.
In this paper, Jamieson argues that Regan’s own views concerning duties of 
assistance are inadequate, because Regan does not tell us under what con-
ditions we have duties to assist those who are threatened by agents, and we 
sometimes have duties to assist those in distress if they are not threatened 
by agents. Jamieson maintains that if we try to supplement Regan’s theory 
with a class of nondiscretionary duties different than duties of justice, then 
Regan’s response becomes ad hoc. Jamieson claims that to limit the duty to 
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render assistance permits Regan to avoid an argument that if animals have 
rights, then we have duties to protect them from their predators. Jamieson 
points out that there are serious difficulties with circumscribing the duty to 
assist in the way that Regan does.
Næss, Arne. 1991. “Should We Try to Relieve Clear Cases of Extreme Suf-
fering in Nature?”. Pan Ecology 6 (1): 1-5.
In this essay, Naess argues that the development of life on Earth clearly 
presupposes the process of dying. He explains that because it is totally out 
of our reach completely to eliminate prolonged extreme suffering, it is of no 
practical value to discuss its ethical status, but its existence makes general 
glorification of nature strange. He maintains that respect for the dignity of 
free nature and proper humility do not rule out planned interference on a 
greater scale, as long as the aim is a moderation of conditions of extreme 
and prolonged pain, of both human and nonhuman animals. He explains 
that the higher levels of self-development of a mature being require the 
assistance of any living being to develop its potentialities.
Rolston, Holmes, III. 1992. “Disvalues in Nature”. Monist 75 (2): 250-78. 
https://www.pdcnet.org/pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=monist&id= 
monist_1992_0075_0002_0250_0278. doi: 10.5840/monist199275218.
In this paper, Rolston claims that there are many disvalues in nature 
(predation, parasitism, selfishness, randomness, blindness, disaster, 
indifference, waste, struggle, suffering and death), but there is value too, 
and transformation of disvalue into value. He claims that we wrongly 
evaluate nature when we restrict value to human consciousness, and we 
make value a prisoner of the particular sort of experiential biology and 
psychology that humans happen to have, or even of the particular sort 
of culture that humans happen to have chosen. He argues that since the 
world we have is the only world logically and empirically possible under 
the natural givens on Earth such a world ought also to be. Included in: 
Brennan, Andrew, ed. 1995. The Ethics of the Environment, 87-115. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth.
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Dawkins, Richard. 1995. “God’s Utility Function”. Scientific American 247 
(6): 80-5. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican1195-80.
In this essay, Dawkins gives several examples that demonstrate that the 
utility function of life, that is, the one that is being increased to become 
as great as possible in the natural world, is DNA survival. He maintains 
that the sex ratio in wild animals is generally 50:50, something without eco-
nomic sense in several species. He points out that longevity is not valued 
for its own sake but only for the sake of future reproduction. He explains 
that maximation of DNA survival is not directly related to happiness. He 
suggests that the total amount of suffering in the natural world is huge. He 
concludes that the universe has no design or purpose. Included in: Dawk-
ins, Richard. 1995. River Out of Eden: a Darwinian View of Life, 95-134. 
New York: Basic Books.
Ng, Yew-Kwang. 1995. “Towards Welfare Biology: Evolutionary Economics 
of Animal Consciousness and Suffering”. Biology and Philosophy 10 (4): 255-
85. http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00852469. doi: 10.1007/
BF00852469.
In this paper, Ng uses evolutionary economics and population dynamics to 
help answer basic questions in welfare biology: which species are affective 
sentients capable of welfare, whether they enjoy positive or negative welfare, 
and whether their welfare can be dramatically increased. He argues that more 
complex niches benefit the evolution of more rational species. He points 
out that evolutionary economics also supports the common-sense view that 
individual sentients failing to survive to mate suffer negative welfare. He dis-
cusses the contrast between growth maximation, average welfare, and total 
welfare maximation. He shows that welfare could be increased without even 
sacrificing numbers of wild animals, at equilibrium. He concludes that we 
must aspire to understand more about animal suffering, so that we are able 
to alleviate the suffering of wild animals in the future.
Kirkwood, J.K., and A.W. Sainsbury. 1996. “Ethics of Interventions for 
the Welfare of Free-Living Wild Animals”. Animal Welfare 5 (3): 235-43. 
In this essay, Kirkwood and Sainsbury argue that there are circumstances in 
which the wellbeing of wild animals can be improved by therapeutic inter-
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vention, but the difficulties, and their potentially harmful consequences, 
should not be underestimated. They point out that there are sound argu-
ments for not intervening for the welfare of wild animals that are sick or 
injured as a result of natural (as opposed to human-induced) processes, 
except perhaps to give euthanasia to individuals that may be suffering from 
severe pain or distress. However, they conclude that treatment and reha-
bilitation is a course of action consistent with current ethical approaches to 
the welfare of nonhuman animals implemented where the harm has been 
caused directly or indirectly by humans, or where the harmed animals are 
to some degree under human stewardship. 
Alward, Peter. 2000. “The Naive Argument against Moral Vegetarianism”. 
Environmental Values 9: 81-9. http://www.environmentandsociety.org/
mml/alward-peter-naive-argument-against-moral-vegetarianism.
doi: 10.3197/096327100129341985.
In this paper, Alward claims that if it is morally wrong for humans to eat 
the meat of certain animals, it is also wrong for lions and tigers and other 
carnivores to do so; and the differences in cognitive capacities and bio-
logical needs between humans and other animals do not undermine this 
conclusion. He points out that if eating the meat of an animal that was 
killed for the purpose of being eaten is morally wrong, then we are under 
an obligation to prevent carnivores from eating meat when we can. He con-
cludes that, given the cruelty of allowing an animal to starve to death, if no 
alternate food source can be found for them, it seems that we are under an 
obligation to mercy-kill them. 
Benatar, David. 2001. “Why the Naive Argument against Moral Veg-
etarianism Really Is Naive”. Environmental Values 10: 103-12. http://www.
erica.demon.co.uk/EV/EV1006.html. doi: 10.3197/096327101129340769.
In this essay, Benatar explains the “innocent argument against moral 
vegetarianism”, using the terminology of Peter Alward. According to 
Benatar, Alward’s argument caricatures the vision of moral vegetarians, 
and Alward’s answers fail against several objections. For Benatar, the 
dependence of carnivores regarding meat-eating is a morally relevant dif-
ference between them and humans, provided the acceptance of what is 
considered by Benatar a more refined moral vegetarian thesis: eating the 
meat of an animal with certain properties who was killed for the purpose 
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of being eaten is morally wrong if it was made by anything less than very 
weighty reasons. Benatar does not consider it immoral that nonhuman 
animals must kill in orden to survive, but he thinks it is unfortunate and 
regrettable.
Musschenga, Albert W. 2002. “Naturalness: beyond Animal Welfare”. 
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 15: 171-86. http://link.
springer.com/article/10.1023%2FA%3A1015040708125. doi: 10.1023/
A:1015040708125.
In this paper, Musschenga claims that a concern for the development of 
natural capabilities of a wild animal should be distinguished from the pres-
ervation of the naturalness of its behavior and appearance. He asks whether 
we have moral reasons to respect concerns for the naturalness of an ani-
mal’s living that transcend its welfare. He argues that the moral relevance of 
such considerations can be grasped when we see animals as entities bearing 
nonmoral intrinsic values. He considers that caring for an animal’s natu-
ralness should then be understood as caring for such intrinsic values, and 
these provide moral reasons for action only if they are seen as constitutive 
of the good life for humans. He concludes by reinterpreting the notion of 
indirect duties regarding animals within the framework of a perfectionist 
ethical theory, which go beyond and supplement the direct duties towards 
animals.
Bovenkerk, Bernice, Frans Stafleu, Ronno Tramper, Jan Vorstenbosch, and 
Frans W.A. Brom. 2003. “To Act or Not to Act? Sheltering Animals from 
the Wild: a Pluralistic Account of a Conflict between Animal and Environ-
mental Ethics”. Ethics, Place and Environment 6 (1): 13-26. http://www.
tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13668790303539#.U8K0V0e8DBY. 
doi: 10.1080/13668790303539.
In this essay, Bovenkerk, Stafleu, Tramper, Vorstenbosch and Frans 
explain that lost or ill seals in the Netherlands are rescued and taken into 
shelters, and afterwards reintroduced into their natural environment. They 
analyze the moral assumptions behind the arguments of both the propo-
nents and opponents of sheltering within a morally pluralistic framework. 
They point out that sheltering on too large a scale would be contrary to the 
efforts to maintain an independent or wild seal population, which means 
that a certain amount of caution is called for, but there is no decisive reason 
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to completely prohibit shelters in the current situation. They conclude that 
the acceptability of sheltering wild animals depends on the specific circum-
stances in which an animal is encountered.
Cowen, Tyler. 2003. “Policing Nature”. Environmental Ethics 25 (2): 169-
82. doi: 10.5840/enviroethics200325231.
In this paper, Cowen argues that utilitarian, deontological and holistic 
approaches support modest steps to limit or control the predatory activity 
of carnivores on their victims. He explains that the axiom that controlling 
nature is intrinsically evil is incompatible with other axioms: animal wel-
fare matters, animals deserve moral consideration, and painful death of an 
animal is bad. He does not conclude it is necessary to support the control 
of nature with certainty, because it is possible that the predator/prey rela-
tionships do not matter for moral philosophy; but that there is a problem 
with not engaging in control of nature when the cost is zero. He concludes 
that we should take the issue of controlling nature seriously and at least 
we should limit current subsidies for carnivorous animals; but control of 
nature need not be absurdly costly or violate what, according Cowen, are 
common sense intuitions.
Fink, Charles K. 2005. “The Predation Argument”. Between the Species 13 
(5). http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1041&context=bts.
In this essay, Fink claims that the so-called predation reductio (the claim 
that we should not be concerned about animal interests since otherwise 
we will have a reason to be concerned about predation) cannot be easily 
dismissed, as many philosophers have tried to do, like Peter Singer and 
Tom Regan. He presents Steve Sapontzis’ answer to the predation argu-
ment. Fink argues that it is not inherently absurd to suppose that there is 
an obligation to protect animals from natural predators, even if this obliga-
tion has limited practical application; nor does it conflict with our deepest 
moral convictions, except, perhaps, in the case of ethical holists. He points 
out that if someone has the conviction that we should strive to reduce the 
amount of suffering in the world, then assisting prey animals, in some cases 
at least, is one way in which this might be accomplished. 
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Clarke, Matthew, and Yew-Kwang Ng. 2006. “Population Dynamics and 
Animal Welfare: Issues Raised by the Culling of Kangaroos in Puckapu-
nyal”. Social Choice and Welfare 27 (2): 407-22. http://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007%2Fs00355-006-0137-8. doi: 10.1007/s00355-006-0137-8.
In this paper, Clarke and Ng discuss the killing of kangaroos at the Pucka-
punyal Army base (Australia) due to conservationist reasons, and address 
animal welfare issues related to population dynamics. They argue that 
natural selection benefits the maximation of the number of surviving off-
spring, and claim that this need not result in the maximation of the welfare 
of individuals in the species. They illustrate the contrast between growth 
maximation and welfare maximation for a single population, and they 
then discuss this in terms of competing populations. They point out that 
the variant of different birthrates does not affect the population sizes at 
equilibrium. They conclude that welfare could be much higher at lower 
birthrates without even reducing numbers, at equilibrium.
Hadley, John. 2006. “The Duty to Aid Nonhuman Animals in Dire Need”. 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (4): 445-51. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00358.x/abstract. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
5930.2006.00358.x.
In this essay, Hadley claims that most moral philosophers accept that we 
have obligations to provide at least some aid and assistance to distant stran-
gers in dire need. He points out that philosophers who extend rights and 
obligations to nonhuman animals, however, have been less than explicit 
about whether we have any positive duties to free-roaming or wild animals. 
He argues that our obligations to free roaming nonhuman animals in dire 
need are essentially no different to our obligations to severely cognitively 
impaired distant strangers. He addresses three objections to the view that 
we have positive duties to free-roaming nonhuman animals, and responds 
to the predation objection to animal rights. He examines the problem of 
how demanding morality will be once it is thoroughly purged of speciesism.
Morris, Michael C., and Richard H. Thornhill. 2006. “Animal Liberationist 
Responses to Non-Anthropogenic Animal Suffering”. Worldviews: Envi-
ronment, Culture, Religion 10: 355-79. doi: 10.1163/156853506778942077.
In this paper, Morris and Thornhill argue that animal liberationists pay little 
attention to wild animal suffering. Morris and Thornhill examine a range of 
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different responses animal liberationists give to the issue of nonanthropo-
genic suffering, but find none of them entirely satisfactory. They consider 
that responses that lead logically to the conclusion that anthropogenic 
suffering should be eliminated can apply equally logically to wild animal 
suffering. They maintain that the solution of micro-managing habitats to 
prevent suffering is counter-intuitive, and on closer examination eliminates 
the intrinsic value of animals’ lives. They support acceptance of the intrin-
sic value of individual animal lives, extending this from either individual 
human lives, or from biodiversity, species and ecosystems. They suggest 
that the combination of animal liberation and environmentalism only really 
makes sense in the context of a belief in the redeemable qualities of nature.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2006. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, 
Species Membership. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
In this book, Nussbaum develops her capabilities approach. She points out 
that the interrelationships of animals is a problem for the existence of an 
overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
support and sustain the political conception around animal rights, because 
those interrelationships (and relations of animals with environment) are not 
usually harmonious. She argues that what is morally relevant is what hap-
pens to the victim. She considers it plausible to suppose that we have less 
responsibility to protect prey than domesticated animals, although perhaps 
we should protect animals that can be predated without a massive interven-
tion. She maintains that the non-violent method of population control of 
neutering is preferable; but if it is not possible, then whatever would result 
in the least painful death should be chosen.
Young, Stephen M. 2006. “On the Status of Vermin”. Between the Species 
13 (6). http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1038&context=bts.
In this essay, Young defines “vermin” and analyzes the moral concerns sur-
rounding vermin and the potential implications. He thinks that the home-
less are perfect candidates for vermin-hood because they are a drain on our 
economy and pose health risks, not only to themselves but also to others 
who are daring enough to walk within close proximity; but we have shelters 
and rehabilitation programs, and we don’t advocate exterminating them. 
He thinks that if we must extend moral consideration to animals because 
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the arguments for keeping them separate are unconvincing to a well-
informed, well-reasoning person, then we must extend moral consideration 
to nonhuman animals considered to be “vermin”. He concludes that if this 
is not suitable, then we must extend vermin-hood to humans, specifically it 
ought not seem morally abhorrent to exterminate the homeless. 
Simmons, Aaron. 2009. “Animals, Predators, the Right to Life and the 
Duty to Save Lives”. Ethics and the Environment 14 (1): 15-27.
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/ethics_
and_the_environment/v014/14.1.simmons.html. doi: 10.1353/een.0.0018.
In this paper, Simmons points out that one challenge to the idea that ani-
mals have a moral right to life is that any such right would require us to 
intervene in the wild to prevent animals from being killed by predators. 
He argues that the belief in an animal’s right to life does not commit us to 
supporting a program of predator-prey intervention. He maintains that a 
common retort to the predator challenge is that we are not required to save 
animals from predators because predators are not moral agents, and that 
the retort fails to overcome the predator challenge. He seeks to articulate a 
more satisfactory argument by explaining why we are not required to save 
wild prey from predators and how this position is perfectly consistent with 
the idea that animals have a basic right to life.
Hettinger, Ned. 2010. “Animal Beauty, Ethics, and Environmental Pres-
ervation”. Environmental Ethics 32 (2): 115-34. https://www.pdcnet.org/
pdc/bvdb.nsf/purchase?openform&fp=enviroethics&id=enviroethics_
2010_0032_0002_0115_0134. doi: 10.5840/enviroethics201032215. 
In this essay, Hettinger claims that animal beauty provides a significant 
aesthetic reason for protecting nature. He argues that worries about the 
aesthetic discrimination and the ugliness of predation might make one think 
otherwise. He maintains that although it has been argued that aesthetic merit 
is a trivial and morally objectionable basis for action, aesthetic merit is an 
important value and a legitimate basis for differential treatment, especially in 
the case of animals. He points out that while suffering and death of animals 
due to predation are important disvalues that must be accepted, predation’s 
tragic beauty has positive aesthetic value that can be appropriately aestheti-
cally appreciated. He concludes that the suffering and death in predation 
need not lead us to conclude that predation is aesthetically negative. 
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Horta, Oscar. 2010a. “Debunking the Idyllic View of Natural Processes: 
Population Dynamics and Suffering in the Wild”. Télos 17 (1): 73-88. 
http://www.usc.es/revistas/index.php/telos/article/view/284/250.
In this essay, Horta points out that it is commonly and mistakenly believed 
that the moral consideration of nonhuman animals entails respect for natural 
processes, on the assumption that nonhuman animals are able to live rela-
tively easy and happy lives in the wild. He maintains that this belief is mis-
taken, because the overwhelming majority of nonhuman animals die shortly 
after they come into existence due to the prevalent reproductive strategy in 
nature, r-selection. This means that their suffering vastly outweighs their 
happiness. He argues that concern for nonhuman animals entails that we 
should try to intervene in nature to reduce the enormous amount of harm 
they suffer. He claims that this conclusion can only be rejected from a specie-
sist viewpoint, even if it may seem extremely counter-intuitive at first sight.
Horta, Oscar. 2010b. “The Ethics of the Ecology of Fear against the 
Nonspeciesist Paradigm: a Shift in the Aims of Intervention in Nature”. 
Between the Species 13 (10): 163-87. http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/
bts/vol13/iss10/10/.
In this paper, Horta discusses an example of human intervention in the wild 
for anthropocentric or environmental reasons: the reintroduction of wolves 
in places where they no longer live in order to create what has been called 
an ecology of fear. This proposal is currently being discussed in places such 
as Scotland. He discusses the reasons for this measure and argues that they 
are not compatible with a nonspeciesist approach. Then, he claims that if 
we abandon a speciesist viewpoint we should change completely the way in 
which we should intervene in nature. He argues that rather than interven-
ing for environmental or anthropocentric reasons, we should do it in order 
to reduce the harms nonhuman animals suffer. He concludes that this con-
flicts significantly with some fundamental environmental ideals that are not 
compatible with the consideration of the interests of nonhuman animals.
Palmer, Clare. 2010. Animal Ethics in Context. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
In this book, Palmer explores the issue of humanity’s moral obligation to 
assisting animals. She notes that one intuitively believes obligations to be 
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dependent on whether the animal is domesticated or wild (“laissez-faire 
intuition”) or on the assumption that one should leave wild animals alone. 
She contends that all animals deserve moral consideration, based on their 
capacity for experiential well-being. She claims, though, that humans have 
a prima facie obligation not to harm wild animals but not usually the duty 
to assist them (i.e. if a storm followed by floods kills them), though we 
should intervene if we come across some animals in need. She argues that 
in the case of some human beings having caused the conditions that are 
harmful for animals, we should do something to help, though what this 
help would turn out to be varies with the context. 
Donaldson, Sue, and Will Kymlicka. 2011. Zoopolis: a Political Theory of 
Animal Rights. New York: Oxford University Press.
In this book, Donaldson and Kymlicka develop a political theory of animal 
citizenship that divides animals into domesticated (companion animals and 
animals raised for food), wild animals, and liminal animals (adapted to life 
amongst humans, without being under the direct care of humans). They 
argue that domesticated animals should be citizens, wild animals should 
have sovereignty, and liminal animals should be treated as denizens. They 
propose that human interventions within wildlife habitats are permissible if 
they uphold the sovereign animals’ value of self-determination, like selec-
tive logging that increases light and air circulation in a closed forest envi-
ronment, aiding individual wild animals in need, and providing them with 
vaccination. They consider that liminal animals have certain rights within 
our shared habitat, but not rights as robust as those of citizens.
Ebert, Rainer, and Tibor R. Machan. 2012. “Innocent Threats and the 
Moral Problem of Carnivorous Animals”. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 
(2): 146-59. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.
1468-5930.2012.00561.x/abstract. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2012.00561.x. 
In this paper, Ebert and Machan argue that the existence of predatory ani-
mals reveals a weakness in Regan’s ([1983] 2004) theory. They show that 
there are cases in which Regan’s approach implies a duty not to assist the 
animal at risk, contrary to his own moral beliefs. They argue that a modified 
account of animal rights that accepts the moral patient as a kind of entity 
that can violate moral rights avoids this conclusion, but it makes nonhu-
man predation a rights issue that ought to be regulated. They claim that 
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Everett (2001, 54) and Gruen (2011, 182) base their treatment of predation 
in part on Regan’s theory, running into similar problems. They suggest that 
if it is found less plausible to introduce morality to the wild than to keep 
the concept of rights out, then it is possible to reject nonhuman animal 
rights or to accept a libertarian-ish theory of animal rights. 
Cochrane, Alasdair. 2013. “Cosmozoopolis: the Case against Group-Dif-
ferentiated Animal Rights”. LEAP: Laws, Ethics and Philosophy 1: 127-41. 
http://leap-journal.com/archives/LEAP1-Alasdair-Cochrane.pdf.
In this essay, Cochrane claims that relational position and group-based 
distinctions are less important in determining the rights of animals than 
Zoopolis concludes. He argues that the theory of animal rights developed in 
this book is vulnerable to some of the critiques that are made against theo-
ries which differentiate the rights of humans on the basis of group-based 
distinctions. He maintains that, in the human context, group-differentiated 
theories of rights have been criticized on a number of important grounds: 
for failing to extend to non-associates rights that ought to be so extended; 
for granting too much weight to the rights of associates over non-associates; 
for wrongly treating groups as homogenous entities; and for also assuming 
that these groups necessarily have value as they presently exist.
Donaldson, Sue, and Will Kymlicka. 2013. “A Defense of Animal Citizens 
and Sovereigns”. LEAP: Laws, Ethics and Philosophy 1: 143-60.
http://leap-journal.com/archives/LEAP1-Donalson-Kymlicka.pdf.
In this paper, Donaldson and Kymlicka respond to Cochrane and Horta 
challenges to Zoopolis’ arguments, including in particular those challeng-
ing the specific models of animal citizenship and animal sovereignty this 
book offers. Donaldson and Kymlicka focus on three issues: the need for 
a group-differentiated theory of animal rights with ideas of membership 
in bounded communities, against more “cosmopolitan” or “cosmozoo-
polis” alternatives that reduce the moral significance of boundaries and 
membership; the challenge of defining the nature and scope of wild 
animal sovereignty; and the problem of policing nature and humanitarian 
intervention to reduce suffering in the wild. They conclude that a theory 
of justice for wild animals is needed, so predation should be seen as the 
kind of tragedy we should accept as a parameter of their lives for the fore-
seeable future.
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Horta, Oscar. 2013. “Zoopolis, Intervention, and the State of Nature”. 
LEAP: Laws, Ethics and Philosophy 1: 113-25. http://leap-journal.com/
archives/LEAP1-Oscar-Horta.pdf.
In this essay, Horta points out that according to Donaldson and Kymlicka 
interventions in nature to aid animals must have some limits since they 
could otherwise disrupt the structure of the communities that wild animals 
form which should be respected as sovereign ones, in accordance with 
a claim based on the widespread assumption that ecosystemic processes 
ensure that animals have good lives in nature. Horta argues that interven-
tion in nature to aid nonhuman animals should not be limited as Donald-
son and Kymlicka argue for several reasons: most animals are r-strategists 
who die in pain shortly after coming into existence, and those who make it 
to maturity commonly suffer terrible harms too; and most animals do not 
form the political communities Zoopolis describes. The situation of animals 
in the wild can be considered analogous to one of humanitarian catastro-
phe, or to that of irretrievably failed states.
Sözmen, Beril I˙demen. 2013. “Harm in the Wild: Facing Non-Human Suffer-
ing in Nature”. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5): 1075-88. http://link.
springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-013-9416-5. doi: 10.1007/s10677-013-9416-5.
In this paper, Sözmen examines the so-called predation reductio: humans 
should not alleviate the suffering of nonhuman animals because such 
an obligation would morally prescribe human intervention in nature for 
defending nonhuman animals, which is absurd. She considers it possible to 
avoid the reductio in this way: to intervene only in cases where this is possi-
ble and it can reasonably be estimated not to result in more harm than good. 
She rejects a third way of avoiding the reductio: considering human and 
nonhuman suffering and death as sufficiently different to allow different 
types of responses, because the claim that nonhuman suffering and death 
are not important is only compatible with an anthropocentric bias, and it 
fails to dismiss the obligation created by the harm of animals in the wild.
Vinding, Magnus. 2014. A Copernican Revolution in Ethics. Los Gatos: 
Smashwords. https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/451958.
In this book, Vinding argues that vertebrates and some invertebrates 
can experience a wide range of pleasant experiences. He points out that 
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sentient nonhumans vastly outnumber humans, and many nonhumans 
experience joy and suffering as intensely as humans do, so the vast majority 
of suffering and well-being on Earth is of nonhuman rather than human 
kind. He maintains that suffering is not less bad just because it happens in 
nature, and that wildlife suffering constitutes the vast majority of suffering 
in the world, so wildlife suffering is a moral problem that we should take 
seriously if speciesism is rejected. He argues that the vital first step we must 
take toward doing anything about is to accept that it is indeed an urgent 
problem of utmost importance.
Pearce, David. 2015. The Hedonistic Imperative. Los Gatos: Smashwords. 
https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/514875.
In this essay, Pearce explains how genetic engineering and nanotechnology 
could abolish suffering in all sentient life. He explains that the metabolic 
pathways of pain and malaise evolved only because they served the inclu-
sive fitness of our genes in the ancestral environment, but they could be 
replaced by a motivational system based on “heritable gradients of bliss”. 
This project needs strategic, species-wide pharmacotherapy complemented, 
and synergistically allied, with genetic engineering. He considers that the 
feasibility of this project turns its deliberate retention into an issue of social 
policy and ethical choice. He attaches value in a distinctively moral sense 
of the term only to actions which tend to minimise or eliminate suffering. 
Thirty-five possible objections, both practical and moral, are raised and 
rebutted.
3. concluSionS
The article The Rights of Wild Things (Clark 1979) was the starting point 
for the consideration in the applied ethics literature of the question of the 
disvalue suffered by animals in nature. Note that, previously, the issue was 
dealt with by several authors, like Lewis Gompertz (1852, 11-9; [1824] 
1992, 85-96) and John Stuart Mill ([1874] 1958, 18). However, it was after 
Clark’s paper that further works on this issue were published.
Several essays were published in the 1980’s and 1990’s, but a growing 
number of authors in the field of animal ethics began to discuss the issue 
starting in 2000. Of the thirty-five works included in this annotated bibli-
ography, twenty-five have been published since that year.
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Between 1972 and the early years of 1980s, those theorists addressing 
the issue of the moral consideration of animals had typically addressed very 
general questions. From 1980 on, however, they began to publish more 
sophisticated research (Dorado 2010, 61). There is a relation between the 
growing interest in the question of the disvalue that is present in nature and 
the growing sophistication of the works on animal ethics.
It should be noted that the first authors to address this problem consid-
ered it to be just another issue among the several ones animal ethics has to 
deal with. However, the situation changed with the publication of Towards 
Welfare Biology (Ng 1995), which showed the extent of the existing dis-
value in nature, and the moral significance of this problem. It was not until 
the late 2000s, though, that this paper started to be really influential. From 
2007 on, this paper has been quoted several times by the authors included 
in this bibliography. Since then several articles have been published that 
have examined the moral implications to be drawn not from the existence 
of predation, but from animal population dynamics and the fact that the 
reproductive strategy most animals follows is what has been traditionally 
characterized as r-selection,. 
It should be taken into account that over the years there has been a 
growing consensus among researchers dealing with the problem of what is 
the situation of animals in nature, and the conclusions that can be drawn 
from it. They conclude that disvalue outweighs value in nature for reasons 
shown by population dynamics, and that the rejection of speciesism entails 
that we should help animals living in the wild. They have also agreed that it 
is necessary to continue to do research on this subject. With this in mind, it 
may be possible that in the future, as it was the case in general in the field 
of animal ethics from the 1980s, more sophisticated research on this issue 
will be published. In order for this to happen, contributions by authors 
with other backgrounds apart from philosophy (such as biology, health sci-
ences, sociology, political science, law …) will be instrumental. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the growing interest in such matters 
has influence outside academia. There are websites and discussion groups 
where they are discussed, and there are charities dedicated to raising aware-
ness about the issue, such as Animal Ethics  2. It is likely that this trend will 
continue in the future.
 2 http://www.animal-ethics.org.
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